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plaintiff). The time limitation established, thirteen months, was
sufficiently in the future so that plaintiff would be able to comply
with the order.
The result reached in the principal case seems to balance the
interests of the parties in an equitable manner. The granting of a
preclusion order against a diligent plaintiff who is unable at the
time to provide the information requested would have been an
unfair result. He would be prevented from establishing even his
permanent injuries since the courts still prevent him from reserv-
ing the right in his bill of particulars to amplify his claim for
permanent injuries that appear later.115 His recourse is held to
be a motion to amend his bill, which motion could be granted only
if prejudice to the defendant would not result.116
On the other hand, if the court held a bill sufficient merely
because a party states he is unable to furnish the particulars cur-
rently, the defendant, who has a right to know the permanency
of the injuries claimed in order to prepare effectively for trial,
would be seriously prejudiced. In short, the court, by taking the
middle position between two extremes, has interpreted rule 3042(d)
broadly and reached an equitable result.
DISCLOSURE
Scope of Disclosure in Defamation Actions
In Nomako v. Ashton," 7 the appellate division of the first
department held that a pretrial examination will be granted in a
slander action without requiring that any special circumstances be
shown. Previously, first department cases held that special cir-
cumstances were required before a pretrial examination would be
permitted in defamation actions." 8 The court in Nomako found
that "there is no longer persuasive reason for a general policy
against examinations in intentional tort cases, including defamation
actions."
"15 Brett v. Sinon, 277 App. Div. 890, 98 N.Y.S.2d 54 (2d Dep't 1950);
see also Chimere v. Steinle, 237 N.Y.S2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
116 See, e.g., Handsel v. Weltz, 13 App. Div. 2d 679, 213 N.Y.S.2d 795
(2d Dep't 1961); Overgaard v. Brooklyn Bus Corp., 237 App. Div. 829,
12 N.Y.S.2d 216 (2d Dep't 1939).
"7 247 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1st Dep't 1964).
118 E.g., Murphy v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 8 App. Div. 2d 800,
188 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1st Dep't 1959); Kollsman Instruments Corp. v. Daily
Mirror Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 975, 183 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1st Dep't 1959);
Olian v. Random House, 205 Misc. 878, 130 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
The rule in the second department is that an examination before trial is
permitted in a libel action without proof of special circumstances. E.g.,
Milner v. Long Island Daily Press Pub. Co., 10 App. Div. 2d 519, 205
N.Y.S.2d 14 (2d Dep't 1960).
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The court then reviewed generally the scope of disclosure
under the CPLR in other categories of actions. The limitation
on pretrial examinations will be continued in matrimonial actions
unless need is shown. Similarly, in stockholders' derivative and
other representative actions, and in accounting actions, a pretrial
examination will be contingent upon a showing of a prima facie
case on the merits by evidentiary allegations." 9  Except for those
actions, the court was of the opinion that pretrial examination
should be allowed unless the facts of a particular case would re-
quire the issuance of a protective order.
In another first department case, Roma v. Newspaper Consol.
Corp.,120 the defendant in a libel action moved to vacate a notice
of examination before trial. The court denied the motion on the
grounds that (1) the CPLR indicates a legislative intent to
broaden pretrial disclosure proceedings, (2) the defendant's alleged
privilege does not preclude such examination, and (3) the CPLR
clearly makes no differentiation as to full disclosure based upon
the type of action involved. Note should be taken, however, of
the limitations imposed on disclosure in certain actions in the
Nomako case.
Section 3101(a) of the CPLR provides that "there shall be
full disclosure . . . in the prosecution or defense of an action,
regardless of the burden of proof. . . ." It can readily be seen
that this section does not by its terms distinguish scope of disclosure
based upon the type of action involved. The old Rule of Civil
Practice 121-a also provided for pretrial examination "in any
action." Nevertheless, the courts engrafted exceptions onto rule
121-a in certain types of actions. Pretrial examinations were
originally precluded, in the absence of special circumstances,
in negligence, the intentional torts (including defamation), stock-
holders' derivative, accounting and matrimonial actions on the
ground of public policy.' 21 It was the intent of the Committee to
abolish these exceptions.
122
Since the publication of a libel may subject one to criminal
prosecution, a defendant may claim his privilege against self-
incrimination at a pretrial examination. Hence, the defendant in
119 This appears to be a carry-over from the prior case law, which held
that plaintiffs were not entitled to a pretrial examination as to the
details of an account until the plaintiffs first established their right to an
accounting. E.g., Moffat v. Phoenix Brewery Corp., 247 App. Div. 552,
288 N.Y. Supp. 281 (4th Dep't 1936): De Rapalie v. Gavin, 209 App. Div.
883, 205 N.Y. Supp. 578 (2d Dep't 1924); Lundberg v. Potter, 193 App.
Div. 885, 183 N.Y. Supp. 87 (2d Dep't 1920); Burns v. Hayes, 193 Misc.
501, 84 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
120 40 Misc. 2d 1085, 244 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
121 FIRsT REP. 117, 443; 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEw YORK CIVIL
PRAcTrcE 3101.14, at 31-19 (1963).122 FIRST REP. 117.
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the principal case contended that the granting of a pretrial exam-
ination would, in effect, be a futile procedure.123  The court,
however, did not wish to be so restrictive and held that, hereafter,
pretrial examinations will be granted in defamation actions despite
the possibility that the defendant might claim his privilege. It was
felt that the existence of such a possibility should not preclude
any examination at all; the defendant may take advantage of his
privilege when the privileged matter itself is sought.
Scope of Disclosure in Matrimonial Actions
In O'Donovan v. O'Donovan,'24 the complaint contained four
causes of action. The plaintiff sought a judgment declaring the
defendant's Mexican divorce invalid, a separation on the grounds
of abandonment and adultery and a divorce. The defendant moved
to vacate or modify the plaintiff's notice, which sought to examine
him before trial upon all the relevant and material facts put in
issue by the pleadings. The court granted the defendant's motion,
limiting the plaintiff to an examination of the defendant upon
factual issues material and necessary to plaintiff's cause of action to
establish the invalidity of the Mexican decree, which matters do
not strictly relate to the relations between the parties during their
marriage.
Under the CPA, there were general limitations on disclosure
based upon distinctions: (1) between witnesses and parties; (2)
between admissible evidence and information leading to admissible
evidence on the one hand, and necessary and material evidence
on the other; and (3) between categories of actions.125 In matri-
monial actions, pretrial examinations were generally denied on the
ground that such an examination might prevent a reconciliation of
the parties. 126 Pretrial examinations were not permitted in divorce
actions, 127 or in separation actions, unless special circumstances were
shown.128  However, examinations were allowed in annulment
123 See Corbett v. De Comeau, 44 Super. Ct. 306 (N. Y. 1878), wherein
it was held that a pretrial examination would not be granted in a libel
action because it would be a waste of time.
12441 Misc. 2d 82, 244 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct 1963).
125 FIRST REP. 118.
126 Hunter v. Hunter, 10 App. Div. 2d 291, 294, 198 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1012
(1st Dep't 1960).
127E.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 182 Misc. 860, 49 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
128E.g., Wightman v. Wightman, 7 App. Div. 2d 859, 182 N.Y.S.2d
31 (2d Dep't 1959); Augustin v. Augustin, 277 App. Div. 777, 97 N.Y.S.2d
430 (2d Dep't 1950); Tavalin v. Tavalin, 13 Misc. 2d 909, 179 N.Y.S.2d
137 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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